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Abstract. We present a locational model of banking with two types of pri-
vate banks, honest and opportunistic, and a state bank that is assumed to
be less efficient. Opportunistic banks choose whether to honor their contracts
with depositors depending on the probability of contract enforcement. We de-
rive three types of equilibria, which depend on institutional quality: a “low”
equilibrium in which private banks choose not to enter the market, a “high”
equilibrium in which depositors place all their savings with private banks and
an “intermediate” equilibrium in which state banks and private banks co-exist.
In the intermediate equilibrium, the share of state banks depends inversely on
institutional quality and positively on the proportion of opportunistic banks.
We also show that when enforcement of deposit contracts is subject to a re-
source constraint, multiple equilibria can exist, and that depositors’ perception
of whether opportunistic behavior is present determines the type of equilib-
rium which prevails. We test our theoretical predictions using cross-country
data. We find that both the quality of prudential regulation (or rule of law)
and disclosure are inversely related to the share of state banks, consistent with
our theoretical model. We also find that the incidence of banking crisis, which
proxies perceived institutional quality, is positively related to the share of state
banks.
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1 Introduction
It is now widely accepted that well functioning financial systems can help promote eco-
nomic growth (Arestis and Demetriades 1997, Wachtel 2001, Levine 2002). The mechanisms
through which finance promotes growth, as well as the factors that promote the development
of the financial system, remain, however, less well understood and are, therefore, attracting
a great deal of attention in recent literature. For example, a number of recent papers have
advanced our understanding of the links between finance and industrial structure or growth,
highlighting the particular relevance of finance for the growth of new firms (Rajan and Zin-
gales 1998, Cetorelli and Gambera 2001). A related line of research, which is the starting
point of the current paper, deals with regulation and ownership patterns in banking and
its implications for economic growth (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2000, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer 2002). This research has unveiled a number of interesting cross-country
relationships, which could potentially have profound policy implications. La Porta et al.
(2002), for example, find that the degree of government ownership in the banking system is
negatively related to subsequent financial development and economic growth, and positively
associated with financial instability. If these relationships are causal, as indeed implied by
the authors, then large-scale privatizations of banking systems around the world could pay
off enormous benefits in terms of future economic growth.1 However, if the relationships
observed in the cross-country data are driven by other factors, then it is essential to know
what these factors are and what the implications of such privatizations might be. More
broadly, a better understanding of these relationships would be beneficial from both an
academic and a policy-making perspective.
A careful analysis of government ownership of banks needs to explain why state banks
exist in the first place. Is it purely driven by political motives, as postulated by the “political
view” of state banking, or, as Stiglitz (2002) points out in a more general context, is it a
response to some market failure or institutional deficiency?2 Stylized facts, as well as
empirical studies, provide credence to both possibilities. For example, the evidence from
1The estimated effects in La Porta et al. (2002) are quite large: a 10 percentage points rise in the share
of government ownership of banks reduces the growth rate by approximately 0.25% per annum.
2Stiglitz (2002), pp. 54—59 and 157—160, provides a vivid illustration of the risks associated with prema-
ture privatization in both developing and transition economies. See also Perotti (2001), who discusses the
Russian experience.
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Russia suggests that mistrust of banks by the general public means that most savings are not
in the financial system and that 70% of retail bank deposits are controlled by Sberbank, the
largest state savings bank.3 Additionally, a number of bi-variate cross country regressions in
La Porta et al. (2002), suggest that government ownership of banks is negatively correlated
with property rights protection or other institutional quality indicators, as well as with
political rights or democracy.4
In order to advance our understanding of why state banks exist, this paper offers a
theoretical analysis of depositors’ behavior, when they have a choice between private and
state banks. In order to create room for both private and state banks in equilibrium, we
postulate a plausible trade-off between the two types of bank, the nature of which is affected
by institutional quality. To this end, private banks are assumed to be more efficient than
the state bank. However, some private banks are assumed to be opportunistic, which under
weak institutional quality, may create a preference for the less efficient but safer state bank
among some depositors. The reason why institutions matter for this trade-off is that they
could contain opportunistic behavior. Thus, we have in mind institutions such as prudential
regulation and supervision, contract enforcement, or more broadly, the rule of law, all of
which are fundamental in protecting depositors’ property rights.
Our argument is developed in a locational model of banking that allows us to examine
both banks’ and depositors’ behavior. A novel feature of our model is that we introduce
two types of private banks: honest and opportunistic. The former type always honor their
contracts with depositors (due to, perhaps, high reputational costs), while the latter choose
whether to do so depending on the probability of deposit contract enforcement. To this set-
up we add a state bank that is assumed to be less efficient than private banks. Depositors
are unable to distinguish between honest and opportunistic banks, but know the probability
of encountering each type and also know the probability of deposit compensation, should
they end up with an opportunistic bank that breaches its deposit contracts. This set-up
results in three different types of equilibria. A “low” equilibrium occurs when institutional
quality is low, the proportion of opportunists is high, and no private bank would choose
to enter. A “high” equilibrium occurs when institutional quality is sufficiently high and all
3CSI (Coalition of Service Industries) Background Paper on Russian Banking Services (22 May 2002).
4See Table III in La Porta et al. (2002). It should be noted that the bi-variate nature of these regressions
makes it impossible to determine what are the statistically significant determinants of government ownership
of banks.
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depositors place their funds with private banks. And, finally, an “intermediate equilibrium”,
in which private banks and the state bank co-exist. We show that in the latter region the
demand for state deposit contracts is greater when the enforcement probability is lower
or the proportion of opportunistic banks is greater. We also show that when institutional
quality is poor, non-existence of the state bank leads to a welfare loss. The model is enriched
further by introducing an enforcement externality which arises from fixed resources devoted
to enforcement of deposit contracts and leads to multiple equilibria for a certain range of
parameter values. The equilibrium is then determined by perceived institutional quality:
even when institutional quality is relatively high, the economy may end up in the low or
intermediate equilibrium if depositors believe that opportunistic banks would breach their
deposit contracts.
We test our theoretical predictions using cross-country data by regressing the share of
assets in state controlled banks on a number of institutional quality indicators, which act
as proxies for the variables that are suggested by the theory. Specifically, we find that both
prudential regulation (or rule of law) and disclosure are negatively related to the share of
state banks. Additionally, we find that the incidence of a banking crisis, which we interpret
as capturing perceived institutional quality, is positively related to the share of state banks,
over and above the effect of the other two indicators. Finally, our empirical analysis suggests
that legal origin variables, when entered alongside the institutional quality indicators, are
not significant determinants of the share of state banks which may indicate the relative
importance of institutional quality vis-a`-vis political factors.
Some aspects of our theoretical model resemble arguments found in the “developmental”
view of state banking (Gerschenkron 1962). According to this view, state banks could
jump start both financial and economic development when economic institutions are not
sufficiently well developed for private banks to play their developmental role.5 Our paper
certainly formalizes these arguments and provides modern day empirical support for them.
5Gerschenkron (1962) provides the example of Russia in the 19th century where “...the standards of
honesty in business were so disastrously low that no bank could have hoped to attract even such small
capital funds as were available ...” (p. 19). Modern day examples of opportunistic behavior in private
banking include the recent experience of transition economies with wildcat private banks. The Financial
Times (6 June, 22 and 23 December of 1995, and 30 January 1996) documents a number of such episodes
in the Baltic States. There are also examples from developed economies, which almost invariably reflect
failures of prudential regulation, such as the case of BCCI, and the example of pension misselling in the UK,
including the recent one of Equitable Life.
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However, the paper should not be viewed simply as a modern version of the developmental
view of state banking for at least two important reasons. Firstly, in our theoretical model
we assume that state banks are inherently less efficient than private banks in terms of their
lending and investment decisions, once private banking exceeds a minimal threshold level of
development; this is, of course, a key element of the political view of state banking. Secondly,
while our findings do imply that at very low levels of institutional quality governments could
create state banks to jump start financial and economic development, our main policy
implication is that governments should build institutions that foster the development of
private banking. Our paper also departs from the political view of state banks in at least
two important respects, even though we do assume that private banks are more efficient
than state banks. Firstly, it acknowledges the possibility that there are circumstances under
which depositors may prefer state banks and in so doing it emphasizes the usefulness of state
banks at low levels of institutional development. Secondly, it predicts that privatization of
state banks is at best unnecessary and at worse detrimental. According to our model, state
banks will die a natural death when they are no longer useful. If they are less efficient than
private banks, as suggested by the political view, then, unless they are subsidized, they
would be unable to compete with private banks once institutional quality is sufficiently
high to prevent opportunistic behavior. At low levels of institutional development, on the
other hand, privatization of state banks would be detrimental since no private bank will
choose to enter the market owning to depositors’ mistrust in new private banks. Thus,
an important policy implication of our results is that instead of privatizing state banks
governments should build institutions that foster the development of private banks and
should remove any subsidies from state banks. Our results are, therefore, clearly consistent
with the literature that emphasizes the first-order importance of institutions for economic
growth (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999b).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and its
predictions. Section 3 presents the data and our empirical findings. Section 4 concludes by
offering some ideas for further research.
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2 Theory
2.1 Model
A single state bank and n private banks compete for deposit contracts. The money collected
from private depositors can be invested into a riskless technology with a constant rate of
return r. The depositors are endowed with 1 unit of cash but do not have direct access to
this technology: they have to transact (by striking a deposit contract) with a bank to earn
a return on their cash holdings. There is a continuum of risk-neutral depositors who are
uniformly distributed along a circle. Distribution density and the length of the circle are
both unitary. A depositor incurs a positive transportation cost α per unit of distance.
Figure 1: Structure of the banking industry
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The state bank is located in the center of the circle, and offers a deposit rate rs =
r0s − α/(2π) > 0. Private banks are located anywhere along the circle with bank i offering
deposit rate ri (i = 1, . . . , n). There are potentially many identical private banks that can
enter the industry at a positive fixed cost, F . In this setup, therefore, each operating private
bank competes with its two immediate neighbors, while the state bank is, in principle, able
to compete with all private banks. The return from the state deposit contract is assumed
to be certain: the state bank honors its deposit contracts without fail. This may be because
the accountability of the public sector by means of various bureaucratic controls prevents
the state bank from taking advantage of its depositors, albeit at the cost of lower efficiency
compared to a private bank (see (A2) and further discussion below).
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An operating private bank could be of either opportunistic type with probability γ
(with 0 < γ < 1), or of honest type with probability 1 − γ. The type of a bank is private
information of the bank, while the value of γ is common knowledge.6 An honest bank
never fails to honor its deposit contract: at the end of the deposit contract it pays out the
deposit rate specified in the deposit contract, together with the initial deposit of 1 unit
of cash. The distinction between “honest” and “opportunistic” banks captures dynamic
reputational considerations which are not explicitly modeled in our static framework. A
non-myopic, or “honest”, bank’s concern for the future forces it to honor all its deposit
contracts in expectation of continued custom by its existing depositors. In contrast, a
myopic, or “opportunistic”, bank has no concern for the future and may choose to seize
any short-term gainful opportunity even if it hurts its existing depositors. The gainful
opportunity in the model is the breach of a deposit contract: the bank takes the money
and runs, and therefore the depositor loses not just the promise of ri but also his initial
deposit of 1 unit of cash. An opportunistic bank’s choice between honoring and breaching
its deposit contracts depends, however, on the quality of enforcement institutions. The
latter are assumed to be such that a cheated depositor expects to get a payment of deposit
compensation, d > 0, from the offending bank with probability λ (with 0 < λ ≤ 1).
The timing of the game is as follows.
(1) Private banks decide whether to enter; n banks enter.
(2) Private bank i (i = 1, . . . , n) sets its deposit rate ri.
(3) Each depositor chooses the bank in which to place the deposit of 1 monetary unit.
(4) Opportunistic banks choose whether to honor or breach their deposit contracts.
(5) If a contractual breach has occurred, the affected depositors seek compensation.
(6) Payoffs are realized.
Given the sequential nature of the game, the appropriate solution method is backward
induction. Firstly, for a given strategy of opportunistic banks (namely, breach of or compli-
ance with the deposit contract), depositors choose which bank to entrust with their deposit.
Secondly, given the level of demand for its deposit contracts, each bank sets the deposit rate
6For example, γ may reflect the ease of entry into the banking industry.
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at a level which maximizes its profits. Finally, for the given level of demand and profit max-
imizing level of deposit rate, each private bank determines whether to enter or not. The
benchmark case is analyzed in section 2.2 and then extended to include an enforcement
externality in section 2.3. All proofs are contained in Appendix A.
2.2 Benchmark case
Let q ∈ {0, 1} represent an opportunistic bank’s decision to honor its deposit contracts
where the value of q (q = 1 honor, or q = 0 breach) is set by the bank to maximize its
profits. As a shortcut, call q the probability of compliance (or, 1 − q the probability of
breach). Consider the expected payoffs of the players (depositors and private banks). By
going to a private bank i, a depositor located at distance xi expects to obtain:
Upbi (q) = [1− γ(1− q)] · (1+ ri) + γ(1− q) · λd− αxi, (1)
where αxi is the transportation (or transaction) cost. If the bank does not cheat (with
probability [1 − γ(1 − q)]) the depositor gets the contractual rate ri, in addition to the
initial holding of 1 unit of cash. Otherwise (with probability γ(1− q)), the depositor loses
his 1 unit of cash but expects the deposit compensation of d with probability λ.
Any private bank at the end of the deposit contract has in its possession 1 + r per
depositor. An honest bank honors all of its deposit contracts by paying out 1 + ri, and
therefore retains as (per depositor) profit the difference between the rate r determined by
the investment technology and the rate ri it offers. An opportunistic bank, in contrast,
pays out 1+ ri only if it honors its contract (with probability q), and additionally expects
to lose λd per depositor if it cheats (with probability 1− q). Because the deposit contract
offered by a given bank is the same for all depositors, the opportunistic bank that decides
to breach one of its deposit contracts will cheat all of its depositors. Denoting by Di the
demand for bank i (i = 1, . . . , n), the expected profit of an honest and opportunistic private
bank, respectively, is therefore calculated as follows:
V 1−γ = (r − ri) ·Di, (2)
V γ(q,λ, d) = [(1+ r)− q(1+ ri)− (1− q)λd] ·Di. (3)
The expected payoffs from a deposit contract with a state bank are
U sb = 1+ rs (4)
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to any depositor, because every depositor is one radius away from the state bank (with
rs = r
0
s − α/(2π)), and V s = (r − r0s) · Ds to the state bank. To simplify the exposition
further, the analysis of the model utilizes the following:
Assumption 1 d = 1+ r (A1)
Under (A1),7 the expected payoffs (1) and (3) above simplify to the following:
Upbi (q) = [1− γ(1− q)] · (1+ ri) + γ(1− q) · λ(1+ r)− αxi, (5)
V γ(ri, q,λ) = [q(r − ri) + (1− q)(1+ r)(1− λ)] ·Di. (6)
Assumption 2 rs ≤ r− 3/2 ·
√
αF (A2)
(A2) states that in the absence of enforcement problems, private banking is more efficient
than state banking: the highest deposit rate that the state bank could offer is the rate
which makes the marginal depositor located at distance xi = 1/(2n) from private bank i
just indifferent between private bank i and the state bank. In the case of such a tie, we
could assume that the depositor goes to private bank i. Of course, any depositor located
at xi < 1/(2n) will strictly prefer (the nearest) bank i over the state bank.
Three types of pure strategy equilibria are possible in this game (see Table 1 below):
“high” equilibrium (HE) where all banking is undertaken by private banks, “intermediate”
Table 1: Description of equilibria.
Equilibrium Type of banking demanded?
High (HE) q = 1 private only Di = 1/n
Intermediate (IE) q = 0 state and private 0 < Di < 1/n
Low (LE) q = 0 state only Di = 0
equilibrium (IE) with both the state and private banks enjoying positive demand for deposit
contracts, and “low” equilibrium (LE) where only the state bank is operational. To ease
7Notice that this assumption is biased against the state bank’s deposit contracts, as harsher punishment
of opportunistic behavior will induce private banks to honor their deposit contracts more often.
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the exposition of our results, we introduce the following additional notation:
λ¯ ≡ 1−
√
αF
1+ r
, λ˜1 ≡ 1− r − rs
(2− γ)(1+ r) , λ˜2 ≡ 1−
r − rs
γ(1+ r)
, (7)
n˜ ≡ r(1− γ)− rs − γ(1− λ(1+ r))
2F (1− γ) . (8)
These cut-offs arise from the analysis of (i) an opportunistic bank’s decision to comply with
(if λ ≥ λ¯) or breach (if λ < λ˜1) all its deposit contracts; (ii) an honest bank’s decision to
enter the industry, given the low demand in the presence of breaching opportunistic banks
(if λ > λ˜2); and (iii) demand for a private bank deposits in IE being necessarily smaller
than that in HE (if n < n˜).
Proposition 1 Assume (A1) and (A2). A unique (pure strategy) equilibrium exists and it
is of type:
(i) HE, if λ ≥ λ¯. Then ri = r −
√
αF , Di =
p
F/α, and n =
p
α/F (i = 1, . . . , n).
(ii) IE, if λ˜2 ≤ λ < min{λ¯, λ˜1}. Then ri = [r(1 − γ) + rs + γ(1 − λ(1 + r))]/[2(1 − γ)],
Di = [r(1− γ)− rs − γ(1− λ(1+ r))]/α and n < n˜ (i = 1, . . . , n).
(iii) LE, if λ < λ˜2. Then Di = 0 (i = 1, . . . , n), and n = 0.
Note that the equilibria derived in the proposition are all pooling. It can be easily estab-
lished that a separating equilibrium (in the non-trivial case of IE) does not arise in this
game. This is because any positive demand for private banks’ deposit contracts, which leads
to ex post positive profits, will stimulate entry by both types of banks, given that the fixed
entry cost is the same for either type of bank, while an opportunistic bank can costlessly
mimic an honest bank’s deposit rate offer.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1. HE exists when the enforcement of deposit contracts is
sufficiently good. A high enough probability of penalty under the enforced deposit contract
forces every opportunistic private bank to behave honestly. Consequently, all depositors
prefer private banking over state banking, with the marginal depositor being indifferent
between the two nearest private banks. The equilibrium demand for private banking (as
determined by the location of the marginal depositor) enters the profit function of the
private bank which sets its deposit rate at the profit-maximizing level. All banks being
identical in this equilibrium, the symmetric problem has the unique solution specified by
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Proposition 1(i). Assumption (A2) is necessary to ensure that the marginal depositor gets
as large a payoff from private banking as he would from state banking.8
Figure 2: Equilibria in the benchmark case (assuming rs = r − 3/2 ·
√
αF ).
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In both IE and LE, all opportunistic banks cheat because the enforcement probability
is relatively low. The location of the marginal depositor in either equilibrium determines
the profits of the honest bank which, should it enter the industry, will be setting its deposit
rate at the profit-maximizing level. This level is feasible–gives a positive ex post profit–
when the proportion of opportunistic banks is relatively low while the probability of deposit
contract enforcement is relatively high. In such a case, honest banks enter, and the expected
payoff from private banking is as large as that from the state bank, provided that the
depositor is located close enough to a private bank. If, in contrast, the proportion of
opportunistic banks is relatively large while the enforcement probability is relatively small,
the rate that maximizes an honest bank’s profit, given the demand, has to be set at too high
a level for the honest bank to be able to make a positive (ex post) profit. Hence, the honest
banks do not enter, and the foreseen absence of the honest banks in combination with the
certainty of breach by an opportunistic bank, makes state deposit contracts more attractive
compared to the private deposit contracts. Lack of demand for private deposit contracts
translates into no entry by any private bank. Therefore, in this parameter space, LE prevails.
It immediately follows that in the absence of sufficiently high quality of institutions, state
banking is the only viable form of savings mobilization.
8HE is therefore a standard solution of the “circular city” model, except for the additional condition on
the value of the enforcement probability (Salop 1979, Freixas and Rochet 1997).
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Notice that due to the symmetry of the model, the private banks that enter in either
HE or IE will (a) locate equidistantly from each other, and (b) offer the same deposit
rate. The latter is particularly important in IE: irrespective of the equilibrium behavior
of opportunistic banks (who breach all of their deposit contracts), the equilibrium deposit
rate of any private bank is determined by the profit maximization problem of an honest
bank: given the certainty of breach, an opportunistic bank will not want to signal its type
by posting a deposit rate different from that of an honest bank (otherwise the depositors
nearest to this bank would choose the state deposit contract to avoid being cheated).
Observe also that in the densely shaded area of Fig. 2 HE and IE co-exist, while in
the sparsely shaded area there is no pure strategy equilibrium. The intuition behind co-
existence of HE and IE in the densely shaded area is straightforward. In this parameter
space, both q = 1 and q = 0 can be optimal (depending on the level of demand). If all
players believe that opportunistic banks breach in equilibrium, then depositors’ demand for
a given private bank and the deposit rate set in accordance with the profit maximization
problem of the honest banks (given this demand) is consistent with IE. Thus the belief held
by the players that opportunistic banks breach leads to IE being realized. To check that it
is unprofitable for a given opportunistic bank to deviate unilaterally from the equilibrium
strategy to breach, note that the benefit from deviating is r− ri where ri is set at the level
consistent with IE is smaller than the net benefit from following the equilibrium strategy
of breaching is 1 + r − λ(1 + r) because λ < 1 + ri. Similarly, if the players believe that
in equilibrium all opportunistic banks comply with their deposit contracts, then the level
of demand for a given private bank deposit contracts and the equilibrium deposit rate
determined through profit-maximization of an honest bank are going to be consistent with
HE, which leads to HE being realized. A unilateral deviation from the equilibrium strategy
to comply is suboptimal again: the net benefit of a unilateral breach, 1 + r − λ(1 + r), is
smaller in this range of λ-values than the benefit of following the equilibrium strategy of
compliance, r − ri, where ri = r −
√
αF .
Remark 1 The demand for state deposit contracts is greater when the enforcement proba-
bility is smaller or the proportion of opportunistic banks is larger.
This result immediately follows from Proposition 1, by noting that in IE ∂Di/∂λ > 0,
∂Di/∂γ < 0, Ds = 1− nDi, and Di|LE < Di|IE < Di|HE.
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Remark 2 When institutional quality is relatively poor, non-existence of the state bank
leads to a welfare loss.
Non-existence of the state bank in the present setting is qualitatively equivalent to rs = 0:
in deciding whether to deposit his cash holding in a private bank, the depositor compares
the expected gain from private banking with the certain outcome from doing nothing and
keeping intact his 1 unit of cash. In the parameter space where IE and LE exist (with
rs = 0) in the statement of Proposition 1, non-existence of the state bank implies that the
proportion of depositors Ds that would have preferred state deposit contracts now prefer
to keep their money “under the mattress”, in the face of unchecked opportunistic behavior
of some private banks. Not being able to take advantage of the banking technology, these
depositors’ unwillingness to entrust their cash holdings to a private bank in such a case leads
to a foregone surplus of r ·Ds. Thus, when institutional quality is low, then privatization
of state banks may result in a collapse of financial intermediation.
2.3 Enforcement externality
This section considers a modification of the benchmark model. The modification exploits the
idea that the resources devoted to enforcement of deposit contracts are fixed and therefore
the effectiveness of enforcement (specifically, its likelihood) will decline with the rise of
the fraction of breached market contracts. Let λ(q) = λ0(1 − δ(1 − q)), where λ0 is the
exogenous level of enforcement available in the economy. Then in HE we have λ0 while in IE
and LE the probability becomes λ0(1− δ). Repeating the analysis of section 2.2 under this
modification, the bounds which characterize the equilibria in section 2.2 are re-calculated
as follows:
if λ0 ≥ λ¯ then V γ(q = 1) ≥ V γ(q = 0), (9)
if λ0 < λ˜1/(1− δ) ≡ λ˜e1 then V γ(q = 1) < V γ(q = 0), (10)
if λ0 ≤ λ˜2/(1− δ) ≡ λ˜e2 then r − r∗i ≤ 0 where r∗i = argmax{V 1−γ(ri)}, (11)
and the analysis leads to a statement similar to that of Proposition 1 except that λ must
now be substituted with λ0 in HE or λ0(1 − δ) in IE and LE. An important difference in
results of the enforcement externality case compared to the benchmark case arises from the
observation that for γ ∈ (0, 1), λ˜e1 ≥ 1 if δ ≥ δˆ where
δˆ ≡ r − rs
1+ r
, (12)
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with δˆ ∈ (0, 1) for any γ ∈ (0, 1), and in such a case, the “if” part of the statement in (10)
is trivially satisfied.
Remark 3 For a sufficiently large enforcement externality, δ > δˆ, the equilibrium of the
game with relatively high institutional quality is no longer unique.
Figure 3: Equilibria of the game with enforcement externality δ ≥ δˆ
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Figure 3 illustrates Remark 3. Intuitively, a relatively high institutional quality is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition of HE–which is then a unique equilibrium of the game–when
the externality is not too large. In such a case, every opportunistic bank prefers to honor
its deposit contracts for any positive demand it faces. The bank chooses compliance, rather
than breach, because the expected punishment for breach is larger than its benefit due to a
high enforcement externality. A not too large enforcement externality means that the be-
havior of others does not impact on a given breaching bank’s chances of being punished. The
punishment probability, however, falls as the enforcement externality gets larger. For high
enough value of the externality, compliance is no longer an unconditional optimal choice
(and therefore relatively high quality of institutions is only a necessary condition for HE).
Due to the large externality, compliance is individually optimal if every other opportunistic
bank complies because wide-spread compliance guarantees that in case of a single breach all
of the fixed enforcement resources are devoted to punishing this breach. But if every other
opportunistic bank breaches, breach becomes optimal since the fixed enforcement resources
are spread too thinly to detect an individual breach with a high probability.
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3 Empirical Evidence
This section presents empirical evidence on the determinants of the share of state controlled
banks in total bank assets, using cross-country data. The explanatory variables that we
utilize purport to capture the variables suggested by the theoretical model. The theoretical
variables are, of course, not directly observed, so we use the best available proxies for
these variables. In addition, we utilize legal origin variables to control for the historical
determinants of the share of state banks which may reflect political factors. In the interests
of completeness we report regressions with and without the control variables. This section
is structured as follows. Subsection 3.1 explains the measurement of the variables we use
in the regressions and their sources. Subsection 3.2 presents the models that are estimated
and discusses the estimation method. Subsection 3.3 presents summary statistics of the
data, including pairwise correlations between the variables. Finally, subsection 3.4 presents
and discusses the empirical estimates. Appendix B contains all relevant tables.
3.1 Measurement and Data Sources
3.1.1 Dependent variable: si
Figure 4: Distribution of SOB50
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We utilize the comprehensive dataset of the share of state-owned or state controlled
bank assets as a share of total commercial bank assets compiled by Barth, Caprio and
Levine (2001) as part of the World Bank survey on bank regulations and supervisory prac-
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tices (SOB50).9 The data describing state ownership are primarily from 1999, with some
responses in late 1998 and early 2000. Data are available for 108 countries. The SOB50
variable is not evenly distributed, as is shown in Fig. 4.28% of the countries in the sample
have no state banks. There are no observations of 100% state ownership, with the highest
observed share being 97.1%. However, this does not mean that the “low equilibrium” does
not exist. The World Bank survey did not receive responses on state-owned banking from
countries such as China and Vietnam and did not include countries such as Iran, Libya,
Syria and Algeria. All these countries had 99—100% state ownership in the 1995 dataset
of La Porta et al. (2002). Moreover there are no observations from some former Soviet
Republics, such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and African countries,
such as Congo, Sierra Leone and Somalia, which are at the bottom of the distribution in
terms of regulatory quality and rule of law.10
3.1.2 Explanatory variables
λ variable This variable captures the likelihood that banks which behave opportunis-
tically are penalized and the probability that depositors will receive compensation. There
are two problems with measuring this probability directly. Firstly, while some data on
the number of bank failures and legal action against bank directors are available in Barth
et al. (2001), there is no distinction made between banks that failed because of bad (but
not corrupt) lending decisions and those that failed because of managers behaving oppor-
tunistically. Secondly, countries that do not report any bank failures could either have no
opportunistic banks or tacitly support banks to prevent bank failures. Thirdly, by the end
of the 1990s many countries had implemented explicit deposit insurance schemes or had
made implicit bailout promises. However, there are no data on how credible the promise of
full, speedy compensation is in practice.11
Therefore our preferred way of creating a proxy for λ is to focus on the regulatory
environment. One comprehensive database is the Kaufmann (1999a) database of gover-
nance indicators. One of their variables, “regulatory quality”, is constructed from a survey
9The share is denoted here by si which in terms of our theoretical model is the same as 1− µ.
10The observation of state share in bank assets of 97.1% is from Turkmenistan, which has similar regulatory
quality and rule of law scores as the omitted countries mentioned above.
11There are some data in Barth et al. (2001) on the average time taken to fully compensate depositors
the last time a bank failed, but these data are limited.
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of country experts’ opinions on the effectiveness of regulation in establishing private mar-
kets.12 While the regulatory quality index includes measures of “market unfriendly” policies
such as price controls and exclusion of foreign competitors from the market, which are not
relevant for this study, it also includes highly relevant survey results on the adequacy of
bank regulation and the effectiveness of financial regulation. Importantly, none of the survey
questions on regulatory quality is based on the extent of state-ownership in the economy.
A second λ proxy utilized in this paper is the “Rule of Law” indicator from the Knack and
Keefer IRIS 3 database. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) compiles this dataset
and calls this indicator “Law and Order Tradition”. The variable ranges in value from
0 to 6 and “reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept
the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes”. Higher
scores indicate: “sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an
orderly succession of power”. Low scores indicate “a tradition of depending on physical
force or illegal means to settle claims”. We use the latest available data, which describe
rule of law in 1997.
γ variable The γ proxy is intended to capture the proportion of potentially oppor-
tunistic banks in the system. The Barth et al. (2001) database of bank regulations and
supervisory practices contains data on specific legal requirements for entry into the banking
system, which could, in principle, be used to proxy the probability that opportunistic banks
will be granted a bank license. However, the database was constructed in 1999 and by this
time most emerging markets had tightened up their prudential requirements in response
to a combination of banking crises, technical advice from the international financial insti-
tutions and (in Central and Eastern Europe) as part of the EU accession process. There
is, therefore, minimal variation in the entry requirements across countries.13 Also, bank-
ing systems that have recently tightened legislation may retain opportunistic banks from
previous periods when licensing requirements were more lax. Using the 1999 dataset would
not capture this. Finally, the question of whether the law is actually applied or is a mere
12Another potential candidate for a λ proxy would be the rule of law indicator in the same database,
which contains questions on the enforceability of private contracts and protection of financial wealth from
expropriation. However, it also contains information on the extent of the black economy, kidnaping of
foreigners, tax evasion and personal safety, making this too broad an index for proxying λ.
13Except for the minimum capital requirement, which, however, is constant throughout the EU and all
EU accession candidate countries.
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“paper tiger” would not be addressed.
However, the Barth et al. (2001) database contains specific details of the regulatory
environment such as disclosure rules which can provide an alternative way to construct a
proxy for γ. In a regulatory environment that forces banks to disclose information and
requires certified audits, it is more likely that opportunistic behavior is detected. Stringent
disclosure requirements should therefore deter opportunists from applying for a bank license
in the first place or would force them to leave the sector once these measures are put in
place.14 Our γ variable is, therefore, constructed from the following six disclosure dummies:
(i) do banks have to publish consolidated balance sheets, (ii) are off-balance sheet items
disclosed, (iii) are risk management procedures disclosed, (iv) are the top 5 banks rated
by international agencies, (v) is there a requirement for a certified audit (“yes” = 1, “no”
= 0, missing entry = 0),15 and (vi) is accrued but unpaid principal and interest of non-
performing loans contained in the income statement (“no” = 1, “yes” = 0). The γ proxy is
created by adding up the individual dummies, resulting in an index from 0 to 6. As only 4
of 107 countries in the sample score 1 in the index, the index does not perform well at low
levels of disclosure requirements. The bottom two categories are therefore combined into a
low disclosure dummy, while scores of 3 to 6 work as a linear spline.
q variable The banking crisis dummy is included to examine step changes in the
perception of institutional quality and the pervasiveness of opportunistic behavior in the
banking sector. It is based on the comprehensive dataset by Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) on
“episodes of systemic and borderline financial crises”. Systemic banking crises are defined
as episodes during which one of the following is observed: (i) the ratio of non-performing
assets to total assets in the banking system exceeds 10%; (ii) the cost of the rescue operation
is at least 2% of GDP; (iii) banking sector problems result in a large scale nationalization of
banks; or (iv) extensive bank runs take place or emergency measures such as deposit freezes,
prolonged bank holidays, or generalized deposit guarantees are enacted by the government
in response to the crisis.
14Barth, Caprio and Levine (2002) use a similar index called the “Private Monitoring Index” to measure
the extent of private monitoring in the banking system.
15The dummy for the certified audit has three component parts: (i) is an external audit a compulsory
requirement for banks, (ii) are there specific requirements for the nature and scope of the audit and (iii)
are the auditors licensed or certified. The dummy only takes the value 1 if the answer is “yes” to all three
questions.
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The banking crisis dummy takes the value 1 if there was a banking crisis (ongoing or
starting) between 1990 and 1999. It should be noted that a change in state ownership can
occur in two ways after a banking crisis: either savers decide to switch their deposits to state-
owned institutions after a collapse of private banks, or the government takes a controlling
stake in the failing banks to reassure savers that their deposits will be guaranteed. In the
second case, savers who are not happy to retain their deposits in the nationalized bank
normally have the option of shifting their deposits into the private sector.16
A summary of all the variables and their sources is shown in Table 2.
3.1.3 Control variables
Legal origin variables According to recent research into law and finance, differences in
legal traditions may help to explain differences in financial development.17 Legal traditions
differ in terms of the priority they give to private markets versus state power and in how
well private property rights are protected. For the purpose of this analysis legal origin may
help to proxy government preferences in maintaining a state-controlled banking system and
path dependence in economies which had a large share of state ownership in the past.
These factors are independent of the choices depositors make regarding where to place their
deposits, which is the main focus of this investigation.
The five legal origin dummies (English common law, French civil law, German civil
law, Scandinavian civil code and Socialist/Communist law) used are taken from La Porta
et al. (1997). We also include additional countries into the socialist origin group, which
were excluded from the original sample in La Porta et al. (1997).18 For the examination of
state ownership of banking, the effect of the socialist legal origin dummy was expected to
be positive, as the socialist countries started the 1990s with close to 100% state ownership
of banking and slowly privatized state-owned banks over the decade while licensing new
banks to provide private banking services alongside the declining state sector. Countries
with Anglo-Saxon legal origin are more likely to be market-oriented and therefore a lower
share of state-ownership in banking is expected. Countries with French, Scandinavian or
German legal origins are seen as taking a more state-centered approach to banking and
16If they choose not to do so, this is tantamount to revealing a preference for the state bank.
17La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Barth et al. (2002).
18Albania, Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia.
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hence expected to have a higher proportion of state ownership.
3.2 Methodology
Firstly, we report raw correlations between each variable and the extent of bank ownership.
Secondly, we report maximum likelihood estimation results for tests of γ and λ proxies both
with and without the control variables for legal origin for each country. We use the Tobit
estimation technique, since our dependent variable, the share of banking system assets held
by state-owned or state-controlled banks, is a limited dependent variable ranging from 0%
to theoretically 100%. In our sample about a quarter of the observations are at the lower
limit, i.e. no state banks. There are no observations at the upper limit, with the highest
observed share being 97.1%.
The theoretical model implies that a single mechanism determines both the outcome
when the dependent variable is equal to zero and the magnitude of the dependent variable
if it is greater than zero. The Tobit model was developed for exactly this type of problem.19
In the Tobit model there is a latent dependent variable y∗ = xβ + u. y∗ is not observed,
but a variable y is observed. The observed variable has the following properties:
y = y∗ if y∗ > 0 and y = 0 if y∗ ≤ 0.
It would be possible to estimate the two outcomes separately. However, as we argue that
the same dependent variables explain both outcomes and as the dataset is limited (to 81
observations for which all the data are available) it is important that we use the statistically
most efficient technique, i.e. the Tobit. We report the results both excluding and including
the legal origin variables.20
si =
 a+ bλ+ cγ, if RHS > 00 otherwise (13)
si =
 a+ bλ+ cγ + e French + f German + g Scand + h Social, if RHS > 00 otherwise (14)
19See, for example, Maddala (1983).
20We have also performed the regressions using OLS to compare our results to previous literature in this
field, e.g., La Porta et al. (2002). Using a different regression technique does not materially alter our results.
The OLS results are available on request.
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Finally, we report regression results for simultaneous tests of γ, λ and q on the state
share in the banking system both with and without the legal origin dummies as control
variables:
si =
 a+ bλ+ cγ + dq, if RHS > 00 otherwise (15)
si =
 a+ bλ+ cγ + dq + e French + f German + g Scand + h Social, if RHS > 00 otherwise (16)
3.3 Summary Statistics
There was considerable cross-country variation in the share of assets of state-controlled
banks in banking systems in 1998. SOB50 ranges from 0% to 97.1%. The mean share of
banks in which the state had a 50% share in 1999 was 20.6%. Predictably, the (formerly)
socialist countries had the highest share of government owned banks with a mean of 32.11%.
The same countries also had the highest incidence of banking crises and the lowest mean
regulatory quality. Scandinavian origin countries showed the highest level of regulatory
quality overall.
The pairwise correlations reported in Table 3 provide a first confirmation of our hypothe-
ses. The percentage of the banking system’s assets in state-controlled banks is positively
correlated with the incidence of a banking crisis in the 1990s. State control over assets is
negatively linked with the quality of regulation, rule of law and the extent of disclosure
requirements on banks.
The proxies for γ, λ and q are not highly correlated with each other. This is encouraging,
because γ and λ could be strongly linked in principle. The higher the probability of offending
banks being caught, the lower is the incentive for opportunists to enter into the banking
system. The correlation coefficient between the indicator of regulatory quality and the
disclosure requirements on banks is at most 0.425, indicating that the two variables capture
different aspects of institutional quality. The broader “rule of law” proxy for λ is even less
strongly linked to the γ proxy, with a correlation coefficient of 0.238. The two proxies for
λ (regulatory quality and rule of law) are strongly correlated with a correlation coefficient
of 0.538.
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3.4 Empirical Results
Tables 4 and 5 present the Tobit estimation results for equations (13)—(14) and (15)—(16),
respectively. In both tables, letters A and C signify the two alternative proxies used for λ
(regulatory quality and rule of law, respectively). Letter B signifies a further refinement of
the regulatory quality variable, which is explained below.
The proxies for γ and λ are statistically significant at the 1% or at the 5% level, regardless
of the specification of the regression. The regression coefficients are also relatively robust to
different specifications of the equations. Specifically, the coefficient for γ is only minimally
affected by different specifications of the equation.
Equations (13A) and (14A) use the raw regulatory quality index, which is shown to
be highly significant and of the expected sign, with higher regulatory quality decreasing
the share of state banks. At low levels of disclosure requirements (scores of 0—2 on the
index grouped as a dummy) the share of state banking is increased, while each further
disclosure requirement reduces the number of state banks. None of the legal origin variables
is statistically significant.
Equations (13B) and (14B) aim to test whether there is a cut-off point for λ (λ¯ in our
theoretical model, see Fig. 2) above which high equilibrium prevails. The regulatory quality
variable is, therefore, split into a low regulatory quality spline (80% of the sample) and a
high regulatory quality spline (20% of the sample). While the lower regulatory quality
spline remains significant, the high regulatory quality spline loses its statistical significance.
It is therefore shown that increases in λ cease to have a statistically significant effect on
state ownership once a certain threshold of regulatory quality is reached. The estimates for
the disclosure requirements are almost unchanged and none of the legal origin dummies is
statistically significant.
Equations (13C) and (14C) utilize the Knack and Keefer rule of law indicator instead of
the Kaufmann regulatory quality variable as the λ proxy. Again, rule of law has effects of
the expected sign (higher scores lower the share of state-owned banks) and it is statistically
significant, at the 5% level if the legal origins are excluded and at the 1% level if legal origins
are included. For the first time the socialist legal origin indicator becomes statistically
significant at the 5% level (equation (14C)). The result could be interpreted as showing
that there are some aspects of contract enforcement in the banking systems, which are
captured less well by the rule of law indicator than by the regulatory quality index. On the
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other hand, the regressions are based on a smaller number of observations than regressions
(14A) and (14B).
In Table 5 the banking crisis dummy enters, as expected, with a positive coefficient and
is highly significant in most equations, frequently at the 1% level. The qualitative nature of
the rest of the results remains unchanged, except perhaps for the statistical significance of
the rule of law variable, which is now sensitive to the inclusion of the legal origin variables.
Regressions (15A) and (16A) confirm the results of regression (13A) and (14A), with
regulatory quality and the high disclosure spline reducing the share of state-owned banking,
which is significant at the 1% level regardless of whether legal origins are included. The
banking crisis dummy raises state ownership and the latter is significant at the 1% level.
The low disclosure dummy is significant at the 5% level, suggesting that countries with lax
disclosure requirements have higher levels of state ownership.
Regressions (15B) and (16B) re-confirm the existence of a λ-threshold: among the coun-
tries with the highest scores of regulatory quality there is no longer a significant positive
effect of further raising regulatory quality.
Regression (15C) shows that while the rule of law indicator still has the expected effect of
lowering state ownership, it is no longer statistically significant if the banking crisis dummy
is included in the specification. The latter enters the regression positively, as expected, and
is significant at the 1% level. If the legal origin variables are included into the estimation,
as is the case in regression (16C), the rule of law indicator regains its statistical significance
at the 5% level. However, this undermines the significance of the banking crisis dummy,
which declines to the 10% level. The sensitivity of some of the results in regressions (15C)
and (16C), which may be partly ascribed to the smaller sample, nevertheless highlights the
possible interaction between the socialist legal origin and the banking crisis dummy, as most
of the formerly socialist countries experienced a banking crisis during their transition.
The results suggest that after a decade of aggressive privatization, fixed country effects
and legal traditions have little influence on the degree of government ownership of banks.
Instead, regulation appears to be the key to fostering a private banking system. High de
facto regulatory quality appears to inspire confidence in private sector banking practices and
hence reduces the need for state banks as a safe haven for private sector deposits. Similarly,
strict disclosure rules, which allow private monitoring of bank behavior, appear to deter
opportunists from entering a market. Finally, systemic banking crises seem to alter public
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perceptions about the risks involved in transacting with private banks. A past banking
crisis appears to lower demand for private banking services and encourages depositors to
keep their savings in either state banks or banks that have (at least partially) been taken
over by the state in the resolution of a banking crisis.
To sum up, the results presented in this section are consistent with the predictions of the
theoretical model. Specifically, the share of state control over bank assets is inversely related
to institutional quality, as measured by the overall quality of regulation or the broader
rule of law indicator, and stringent disclosure requirements. Additionally, perceptions of
institutional quality, which are likely to be affected by previous banking crises, also seem
to be important determinants of the share of state banks. Thus, improving the institutions
that foster the development of private banks is an effective way of reducing the role of state
banks in the economy.
4 Concluding Comments
Our findings suggest that the relationship between state banks, financial development and
economic growth may be more complex than is implied by recent literature. By highlighting
the importance of institutions, they open up a number of potentially fruitful avenues for
further research. It would, for example, be useful to re-examine this relationship in a
dynamic setting, utilizing perhaps an endogenous growth framework. This may result in
a new theory of financial development, in which both institutions and state banks play a
prominent, albeit changing, role. Empirically, it would be useful to examine any dynamic
relationships that may emerge from theory using a long run of time-series data. Such
data are clearly well suited to capture aspects of the “life-cycle” of state banks and their
relationship with institutions, financial development and growth that are implied by our
model. We believe that such an examination may reveal important non-linearities in these
relationships, as well as changing causal patterns between the variables concerned, reflecting
the evolution of institutions over time.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
For each type of the equilibrium, derive the necessary conditions by specifying the equilib-
rium behavior of an opportunistic bank, a marginal depositor, and an honest bank.
In HE, for a given level of demand for private banking, an opportunistic bank prefers
to comply with its deposit contracts:
r − ri ≥ (1+ r)(1− λ), (17)
the marginal depositor located at x¯i from bank i is indifferent between the two nearest
private banks and prefers either of these two banks to the state bank:
1+ ri − α · x¯i = 1+ ri+1 − α ·
³ 1
n
− x¯i
´
, (18)
1+ ri − α · x¯i ≥ 1+ rs, (19)
and any private bank sets its deposit rate at a level that maximizes its profits,
∂V/∂ri = 0 where V = (r − ri)Di for any i = 1, . . . , n. (20)
From (18), x¯i = 1/(2n) + (ri − ri+1)/(2α), and therefore:
Di = x¯i + x¯i−1 =
1
n
+
2ri − ri+1 − ri−1
2α
. (21)
Substituting this into (20) and using symmetry, the profit-maximizing rate of any private
bank is equal to:
ri = r − α
n
(i = 1, . . . , n). (22)
Under the free-entry condition, the profits are competed away, and therefore the equilibrium
number of banks that enter is found as:
n =
q
α/F . (23)
Substituting (22) and (23) back into (17) and (19), the necessary conditions of HE are
formulated as:
λ ≥ 1−
√
αF
1+ r
≡ λ¯ (24)
rs ≤ r − 3
2
√
αF. (25)
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In IE, every opportunistic bank prefers to breach all its deposit contracts:
r − ri < (1+ r)(1− λ). (26)
Given that all opportunistic banks cheat, the marginal depositor located at x˜i is indifferent
between the nearest private bank i and the state bank:
1+ rs = (1− γ)(1+ ri) + γλ(1+ r)− αx˜i. (27)
And an honest bank solves its profit-maximization problem, given that all opportunistic
banks breach (q = 0). The latter adversely affects the level of demand faced by every
private bank:
Di = 2x˜i =
2
α
· [(1− γ)ri − γ(1− λ(1+ r))− rs], (28)
which is derived from (27). The profit-maximization problem of an honest bank is solved
by setting:
ri =
r(1− γ) + rs + γ(1− λ(1+ r))
2(1− γ) . (29)
(Note that an opportunistic bank optimally mimics the honest bank’s offer of the deposit
rate, since otherwise the depositors could tell the two types of banks apart and would avoid
contracting with the opportunists.) Substituting (29) into (26) and re-arranging, we obtain:
λ < 1− r − rs
(2− γ)(1+ r) ≡ λ˜1. (30)
The ex post profit of an honest bank is positive when the profit-maximizing level of the
deposit rate ri in (29) is smaller than r (and therefore x˜i > 0). This is equivalent to the
following additional constraint:
λ > 1− r − rs
γ(1+ r)
≡ λ˜2. (31)
It is straightforward to check that λ˜1 ∈ (0, 1) and λ˜1 > λ˜2 for any γ ∈ (0, 1), λ˜2 ∈ [0, 1) if
γ ∈ [(r − rs)/(1 + r), 1), and λ¯ > λ˜1 if γ > (2
√
αF − (r − rs))/
√
αF . The assumption of
free-entry together with the necessary condition of 0 < Di < 1/n gives an upper bound on
the number of private banks that would enter the industry in this equilibrium as follows:
(r − ri) · 2x˜i = F (31)⇔ x˜i = F
2(r − ri) <
1
2n
⇔ 0 < n < r − ri
F
≡ n˜,
where ri is given by (29).
Finally, LE is characterized by the same constraints as IE, except that now honest banks
find it unprofitable to enter: the level of ri which satisfies FOC of their profit maximization
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problem results in non-positive ex post profits, i.e., r−ri ≤ 0 which from the above analysis
arises when (31) is invalidated. Non-positive profits imply that honest banks do not enter,
and therefore the depositors expect to face a breaching opportunistic private bank with
certainty when
λ ≤ λ˜2. (32)
The certainty of breach of a private deposit contract implies that no depositor is willing to
bank in the private sector. Hence the equilibrium demand is Di = 0 for any n > 0 and
i = 1, . . . , n when (32) holds. The equilibrium zero level of demand for private deposit
contracts ensures that no private bank enters. 2
Proof of Remark 3
To establish the claim, we need to find the range of δ-values for which λ˜e1 ≥ 1, and therefore
constraint (10) is validated for any γ ∈ (0, 1):
λ˜e1 =
1
1− δ ·
³
1− r − rs
γ(1+ r)
´
≥ 1 ⇔ γ ≤ 2δ(1+ r)− (r − rs)
δ(1+ r)
. (33)
The latter is true for any γ ∈ (0, 1) if
2δ(1+ r)− (r − rs)
δ(1+ r)
≥ 1 ⇔ δ ≥ r − rs
1+ r
≡ δˆ. (34)
2
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Appendix B
Table 2: Description of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Variable name Definition Date Source
si(dependent) SOB50 Share of total banking sector as-
sets of banks in which the govern-
ment holds a share of at least 50%
1999 Barth, Caprio
and Levine (2001)
λ1 Regulatory quality Measure of whether regu-
lation is effective in pro-
moting private markets
1997/1998 Kaufmann (1999a)
λ2 Rule of law Reflects the degree to which
the citizens of a country are
willing to accept the established
institutions to adjudicate disputes
1997 Knack and
Keefer, ICRG
γ Disclosure index Disclosure rules: consolidated
balance sheets, statement of non-
performing loans and off-balance
sheet items, risk management
procedures, certified audits
required and top 5 banks rated by
international agencies (yes = 1,
no = 0, missing entry = 0). Index
created by adding up dummies
1999 Barth, Caprio
and Levine (2001)
q BCD Perception of the quality of
institutions: Banking crisis
dummy = 1 if there was a
banking crisis in the 1990s
1990s Caprio and
Klingebiel (2002)
Table 3: Correlations
SOB50 Regul. Low High Rule Low High Banking
Qual. Reg.Qual. Reg.Qual. of Law Discl. Discl. Crisis
Spline Spline Dummy Spline Dummy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1.0000
2 —0.4295 1.0000
3 —0.4150 0.9940 1.0000
4 —0.2819 0.4820 0.3836 1.0000
5 —0.3032 0.5367 0.5135 0.4034 1.0000
6 —0.0577 0.3727 0.3685 0.2082 0.0711 1.0000
7 —0.2006 0.4089 0.3598 0.4252 0.2377 0.6263 1.0000
8 0.3323 —0.1969 —0.1814 —0.2010 —0.2647 0.0574 —0.0874 1.0000
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Table 4: Regression results for tests of γ and λ proxies
Dependent variable: Share of banking system assets in state-owned or state-controlled banks
Regression 13A 14A 13B 14B 13C 14C
Variables
λ
Regul. quality —19.522*** —21.23***
(5.936) (6.379)
Low reg.quality spline —17.06** —18.53**
(6.803) (7.114)
High reg.quality spline —44.03 —50.13
(34.565) (35.844)
Rule of law —6.84** —10.81***
(3.247) (3.405)
γ
Low discl.dummy 27.49*** 27.8*** 26.50*** 26.88*** 28.72** 27.51**
(9.883) (9.929) (9.938) (9.938) (12.798) (12.102)
High discl.spline —12.38*** —12.52*** —11.73*** —11.79*** —14.22*** —12.71***
(4.078) (4.311) (4.163) (4.379) (4.379) (4.523)
Legal origin
French 3.16 3.11 -3.09
(7.521) (7.498) (7.925)
German 16.15 15.36 21.8
(12.93) (12.918) (13.390)
Scandinavian 16.93 19.06 21.57
(15.27) (15.467) (15.59)
Socialist 5.66 5.83 28.80**
(9.243) (9.191) (13.449)
Constant 15.54** 12.12 15.90** 12.39 40.02** 53.77***
(7.076) (8.189) (7.058) (8.142) (17.978) (17.933)
N of observations 81 81 81 81 65 65
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5: Regression results for tests of γ, λ and q proxies
Dependent variable: Share of banking system assets in state-owned or state-controlled banks
Regression 15A 16A 15B 16B 15C 16C
Variables
λ
Regulatory quality —15.41*** —17.92***
(5.609) (6.011)
Low reg.quality spline —14.08** —15.87**
(6.018) (6.637)
High reg.quality spline —41.32 —41.36
(44.271) (33.966)
Rule of law —4.59 —8.34**
(3.115) (3.586)
γ
Low discl. dummy 21.06** 21.93** 20.30** 21.34** 23.37* 24.43*
(9.246) (9.308) (9.309) (9.311) (11.917) (11.780)
High discl. spline —10.60*** —11.59*** —10.07** —11.04*** —12.33*** —12.26***
(3.85) (4.081) (3.943) (4.140) (4.257) (4.424)
q
Banking crisis dummy 19.42*** 20.07*** 19.58** 19.81*** 19.46*** 13.03*
(5.87) (6.16) (5.864) (6.143) (7.058) (7.703)
Legal origin
French 2.41 2.44 —2.68
(7.02) (7.008) (7.703)
German 14.23 13.7 18.52
(12.036) (12.033) (13.11)
Scandinavian 11.99 13.8 15.89
(14.245) (14.48) (15.473)
Socialist —3.39 —3.13 18.67
(8.978) (8.946) (14.293)
Constant 8.71 7.95 8.76 8.171 23.69 40.22**
(6.887) (7.738) (6.870) (7.712) (17.773) (19.147)
N of observations 81 81 81 81 65 65
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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